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Abstract  
The extent of recent misconduct in retail financial services questions assumptions that mis-
selling is perpetrated by rogue traders dealing in sub-prime markets. Yet we know little about 
the organizational dimensions of mis-selling and specifically how new employees are 
introduced to and subsequently enact mis-selling behaviour when not explicitly encouraged 
to do so. This article seeks to understand the mechanics of mis-selling through an 
ethnographic account of the opening of a new retail financial services call centre, and 
analysis of the ritual nature of the sales interaction. The study documents the mechanics of 
mis-selling; training, induction and initial work of direct sales agents to better understand the 
complexity, social relations and organization of mis-selling, together with the way in which 
regulation and management regimes shape sales practice and consequent employee 
behaviour. The critical analysis of sales rituals allows us to explain how mis-selling becomes 
embedded in organizational practice and contributes to our understanding of the 
everydayness of mis-selling in contrast to approaches that focus either on individual decision-
making or on cultural explanations. 
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Despite well-established schemes for redress, headline-grabbing fines for transgressive firms 
and a growing industry of claims specialists, little is known about the organizational 
dimensions of mis-selling. Specifically we are yet to understand how new employees are 
introduced to and subsequently enact mis-selling and the scope employees have in 
performing or resisting mis-selling. These are particularly important questions in cases where 
organizations formally reject mis-selling and/or offer regulation to prevent it. Defined here as 
the deliberate, reckless or negligent sale of products and services, mis-selling is performed in 
organizational settings within the context of regulated markets with statutory bodies1 and 
legal protections for customers (Benston, 1999) that in theory should prevent or at least 
challenge mis-selling. The inability of firms and regulators to prevent mis-selling is claimed 
by some to be the ‘stand-out systemic problem in the UK retail financial market’ (Ferran, 
2012: 249). Formal regulation focuses on the notion of ‘treating customers fairly’ (TCF) and 
requires ‘senior management to work out for themselves what practices guarantee fair 
treatment … and is premised on the idea of (enforced) “self-regulation”’ (Georgosouli, 2011: 
406). This implicitly assumes that individual firms have the capacity (and interest) to regulate 
their employees to exercise self-control in the sales process. Yet empirical studies note that 
regulation of conduct is broadly treated as an ‘add on’ rather than a centrally located 
management activity. Moreover, responses to regulatory regimes are more emotional and less 
calculative than is frequently assumed, and compliance is often delegated, shifting 
responsibility to managers to determine the ‘interpretation, implementation and evaluation of 
what complying with TCF entails for their business units’ (Gilad, 2011: 325). 
 
The regulatory framework thus makes a number of assumptions that seem ill suited to the 
market for financial services whilst drawing heavily upon inappropriate presumptions about 
the embedding of regulation within organizational contexts. Given that mis-selling is far from 
‘an aberration, a one-off, [or] unrepeatable episode’ (Black and Nobles, 1998: 789) and that 
enhanced regulation is unlikely to be effective, an empirical focus on front-line employees 
and their direct managers in understanding mis-selling is thus essential. 
 
Persistent and systemic mis-selling has significant implications. Formal schemes of redress 
have imposed fines on firms, which also face indirect market sanctions and loss of both 
credibility and business (Karpoff et al., 2008). In the UK, for example, fines for mis-selling 
include over £10 billion for pensions, £2.6 billion for endowment mortgages and over £16 
billion for payment protection insurance (PPI). Moreover, of the 13 million PPI complaints 
since 2007, 70 per cent have been upheld (FCA, 2014), with many well-known financial 
institutions implicated. Questionable practices in corporate finance such as foreign exchange 
and interest rate fixing, accusations of drug-money laundering and allegations of toxic 
cultures (Alloway et al., 2012) have further fuelled public anxiety and political concerns in 
relation to mis-selling of pensions (Watson, 2008), PPI (Ferran, 2012) and mortgage products 
(Ashton and Hudson, 2012). 
 
The sale of financial products and services takes place within a context of both changing 
markets and consumer culture. Some critical commentators, for example, urge us to see the 
link between the global financial crisis (GFC) and culture more generally, or the ‘cultural 
conditions of possibility’ (Allon, 2009: 370, emphasis original) that produce everyday 
financialized identities. In this sense, the purchasing of financial products, the increasing 
complexity and growth of these products, and the consumption that they facilitate are 
essential markers of status and a ‘prism through which a range of social values are expressed’ 
(Nayak and Beckett, 2008: 409). This trend has intensified over the last 30 years in addition 
to individuals being increasingly encouraged to take responsibility for their own financial 
planning and decision-making, with greater onus placed on the personal provision for a range 
of financial services. It is likely therefore that we are all increasingly exposed to mis-selling 
as a consequence of either the direct transfer of responsibility or a ‘nudge’ (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009) in a free market direction. Those without financial cultural capital (Cooper, 
2008) are especially at risk. 
 
Although mis-selling is yet to be fully explored within MOS, understanding the 
organizational dimensions of mis-selling could potentially draw upon an extensive literature 
pertaining to unethical conduct at work. In order to be persuasive, however, any attempt to 
understand systematic mis-selling must provide an explanation of the collective extent of 
mis-selling behaviour given that individual agents always have the ability to choose more 
ethical approaches to sales. Secondly, given that regulatory regimes are in place, and the 
importance of compliance is generally well understood (MacNeil, 1999), explanations must 
resolve the practical and theoretical puzzle that makes sense of mis-selling despite apparent 
enforcement and evident consequences for malpractice. 
 
In order to shed light on these issues, this article provides an analysis of the opening of a new 
retail financial services call centre. By exploring the training, induction and initial work of 
sales agents, I draw attention to the way in which regulatory and managerial regimes shape 
employee thinking and behaviour as well as the terms of engagement with which interaction 
with customers takes place. I then present an analysis of sales interactions – the central 
defining characteristic of all sales work – as ritualized practice. The anthropological notion 
of ritual, defined here as ‘the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts 
and utterances not encoded by the performers’ (Rappaport, 1992: 249), is invoked in 
acknowledgement of the symbolic, material and embodied nature of repetitive sales 
interactions as revealed through participant observation. 
 
Beyond defining mis-selling as worthy of investigation, and providing a case study of mis-
selling in action, this article’s contribution lies in explaining why individuals engage in mis-
selling when not explicitly instructed to do so and demonstrates the centrality that ritual plays 
in this. Detailed and careful analysis is shown to offer the potential to comprehend how 
performance of ritual ‘express(es) cultural values; it “says” something and therefore has 
meaning as part of a … system of communication’ (La Fontaine, 1972: Xvii), and one which 
predisposes agents to mis-selling. Critically, however, I draw attention to the relation 
between ritual and culture, and argue that through the learning and performing of ritual 
practice, sales agents actually produce culture. The present study thus provides an exploration 
of the processes by which mis-selling becomes accepted organizational practice, and 
contributes to our understanding of the ‘everydayness’ of mis-selling whilst making a wider 
point about the value of understanding the production of culture in contemporary 
organizations, and the methods that we might use to achieve this. 
 
The article is organized as follows. Firstly, I set out mis-selling as a complex social problem. 
In doing this I draw insights from a range of perspectives that make sense of mis-selling as 
either an individual or a collective problem. I then delineate the organizational context in 
which the research was conducted, together with the research methodology that was used to 
investigate the problem, and provide details of analytical processes pursued. I then present 




A systematic literature review reveals mis-selling to be a topic that has received scant 
scholarly attention. The MOS literature, however, offers a number of potentially important 
theoretical resources that have been used to understand unethical conduct in a wider context. 
In very broad terms, our knowledge and understanding of unethical behaviour at work is built 
upon a long-established literature relating to employee conduct (Kaptein, 2011; see Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis) and ethical decision-making (Gunz and Gunz, 2007; 
Watson, 2003). Research that aims to better understand unethical behaviour at work (of 
which mis-selling is an obvious example) focuses largely on the psychological exploration of 
the antecedents of unethical choice (Treviño and Youngblood, 1990; Ashkanasy et al., 2006). 
This work is primarily informed by the view that unethical behaviour is an irrational 
departure from organizational norms and is thus an inherently individualistic form of 
analysis. Despite an atomistic focus, researchers in this tradition note the way in which 
unethical behaviour can spread beyond the individual. Yet rather than broaden out the 
analysis to a collective level, this approach instead reinforces the role of the unethical 
individual as a source of ‘contagion’ to the wider organizational community (Felps, 2006; 
Gino et al., 2009). The small number of high-profile criminal cases for financial misconduct 
(the prosecution of Tom Hayes2for collusive fixing of bank lending rates, for example) act to 
reinforce the presumption that financial crime is generally perpetrated by ‘rogue traders’ 
acting alone and in contravention of organizational protocols. 
 
Outside the MOS field, and when understood as a form of white-collar or corporate crime, 
mis-selling might usefully be interrogated from a criminological perspective. Work in this 
tradition repeats many of the assumptions outlined above by seeking explanatory factors that 
account for individual decisions to engage in unethical sales practice. These common 
assumptions render organizations as merely the location and context for unethical behaviour 
and thus as passive actors. Yet even from within this frame, critical questions about the 
potentially determining role of the organizational context emerge. Karstedt and Farrall, for 
example, note that organizations that focus on selling constitute what they term ‘risk 
environments’. This they argue is crucially important in framing individual decision-making; 
thus within the bounded environment of the firm, ‘risk and opportunity are seen as concepts 
devoid of morality’ (2006: 972). The medium of exchange, thus runs the argument, makes 
unethical behaviour a legitimate choice in the eyes of many employees. Yet the processes 
through which workplaces are able to shed their social and moral obligations are left 
tantalizingly unexplored. A further insight from criminological research is the ‘ambiguous’ 
(Nelken, 2012) way in which these forms of unethical activity are generally perceived in 
society. McBarnet argues that instances of misconduct that involve either ‘creative 
compliance’ (2006: 1097) or ‘gaming the system’ (2006: 1099) are generally construed as 
‘not strictly illegal’ and hence occupy a morally uncertain, or ‘grey’, location in the mind of 
the general public. 
 
The approach adopted here is to identify mis-selling as an important social problem and a 
phenomenon that deserves critical scrutiny in its own right. It is socially significant because 
the level of financial malpractice, whilst high, is under-investigated. Ericson and Doyle 
(2006) suggest for example that deceptive sales techniques are ‘rife’ within the insurance 
industry. Moreover, the prevalence of such unethical sales practice is almost certainly not 
reflected in criminal or civil sanctions. Thus, when considering the fines and redress issued in 
cases of mis-selling, Braithwaite and Braithwaite remind us that the level of the criminal 
threshold means that legal sanction operates in only the most extreme of cases. Therefore, 
MOS has a specific role to play firstly in drawing attention to the scope of this specific form 
of unethical behaviour and secondly in understanding the active role organizations play in 
shaping mis-selling behaviour. Understanding the collective dynamics of mis-selling is 
clearly a prerequisite for the design of organizational interventions and reforms to challenge 
or remove such practices. It is important that organizations take on this challenge, as ‘the 
most effective preventive techniques will be non-criminal and early in a developmental 
sequence’ (2006: 1124). 
 
Making sense of malpractice in financial services: Cultural explanations 
The role that culture plays in financial firms features heavily in both academic and 
popular accounts of the industry and gained particular notoriety for its perceived role in the 
GFC (see inter alia Aldridge, 1997; Cohan, 2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2011; Kerfoot and 
Knights, 1993; Knights and Willmott, 1987; Knights and Willmott, 1992; Tett, 2009; Ward, 
2010; Weeks, 2004). In accounting for malpractice in financial services, the cultural context 
is therefore an important aspect to explore, and may help explain why unethical practices are 
seen as being accepted, required and even promoted (Luyendijk, 2015) as part of life within 
the industry. Yet when invoked as an explanatory factor for misbehaviour, culture is often 
treated as an exogenous variable often portrayed as being externally imposed, be that from 
abroad, in the case of aggressive merger and acquisition (Buono at al., 1985), or cascaded 
downward from corporate elites. Both versions treat culture as a tool used in the sole pursuit 
of profitability, achieved by exponential growth of sales volume against fixed or falling 
capital levels.  
 
In contrast, contemporary and historical accounts of employment relations within banking 
and financial services draw attention to widespread changes in the structure of the industry 
following deregulation. The way in which structural change produces cultural change is often 
implied rather than examined, but many have noted, for example, how financial institutions 
have moved from transactional to sales cultures (Chreim, 2006). In this context, Knights and 
McCabe (1997) show how a genuine interest in customers’ welfare and satisfaction, which is 
often intangible and difficult to measure, is set aside in the face of more immediately pressing 
concerns, like cost minimization and target attainment. 
 
The implications for employees of these changes are profound; Kerr and Robinson, for 
example, chart the transformation from ‘professional advisors embedded in the community 
into sales people with sales targets to meet’ (2012: 257). Such changes are often accompanied 
by the emergence of a workplace ‘culture of fear’ marked by regular rituals of humiliation 
(Kerr and Robinson, 2012: 258). Moreover, as cultures in financial services became 
progressively more short-term, aggressive and sales orientated, so the behaviour of 
individuals who, historically, ‘in return for the promise of the career … undertook to manage 
themselves in the most profound sense to ensure diligent performance and deep conformity 
with the organization’s culture’ (Tempest et al., 2004: 1530) became more instrumental and 
less predictable. 
 
The concept of culture therefore has potentially much to say in explaining the pressure to 
achieve targets in financial services and the impact this has on employee behaviour. 
However, as Dietz et al. remind us that, in complex organizations with many subunits (such 
as retail finance), the notion of a unified organization service climate may be largely mythical 
(2004: 87). Furthermore, Harris (2002) shows that the cultures of different banking 
organizations vary in quite important ways. Moreover, culture’s power to determine the 
behaviour of its employees is likely to be limited by tensions inherent within it. Thus 
McCabe shows how espoused goals like customer service are inconsistent with the 
requirement to ‘regard everyone instrumentally as a potential sales opportunity’ (2009: 
1561). In these tensions, it is argued, lie potential grounds for resistance, meaning that 
managerial objectives can and are contested by employees (Knights and McCabe, 1998: 
173). We also know from work in this tradition that ‘staff are not simply victims of 
management control, but are often active participants in the conditions that maintain and 
reproduce control and the stress and resistance that may follow as a result’ (Knights and 
McCabe, 1998: 188). Thus cultural explanations, whilst possibly insightful, run the risk of 
providing over-deterministic and simplistic explanations that fail to account for variations 
and tensions in employee action. 
 
By exploring how new recruits are introduced to the process of making sales, this article 
attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of the enactment and embedding of mis-
selling as well as employee resistance and accommodation. This approach aims to avoid 
providing a simple narrative of mis-selling that serves a particular predefined ideological 
objective. As Whittle and Mueller note, simple stories of the GFC often ‘(serve) to legitimate 
particular actions’ (2011: 131), but all too readily lead to superficial analysis and policy 
conclusions, without deeper reflection on the ‘paradigmatic assumptions that … contributed 
to the crisis in the first place’ (Knights and McCabe, 2015: 199). 
 
Case study 
Praetorian (a pseudonym) is an international company engaged in what it calls the ‘life 
assistance’ business. Founded in the 1980s, it remains headquartered in the UK, but has 
operations in 15 geographical regions and at the time of the fieldwork (2008) was 
increasingly expanding its operations into developing economies. Throughout its initial 
decade of life, Praetorian made consistent losses, but achieved greater financial success 
through the development of markets for products that the company claimed ‘help consumers 
cope with the anxieties and complexities of modern life’ (company website, 2013). In 1998 
the organization had over 7.6 million active policies, employed over 1000 people and was 
listed on the UK Stock Exchange. 
 
Praetorian’s business model is based on an implicitly commercialized conception of ‘identity’ 
and the explicit productization (Jaakkola, 2011) of ‘protection’. Initially this included credit 
and debit cards following loss, theft or fraudulent use, and later it extended to the ‘protection’ 
of passports, keys and mobile phones. The company thus operates at the intersection of 
insurance and financial services. The firm’s marketing focuses on foregrounding the ‘risks’ 
that an increasingly digital and busy life pose to its customers, and crucially to an abstract 
notion of customers’ ‘identity’ which, the company claims, is increasingly ‘at risk of threat 
and abuse’ in addition to more conventional criminal risks, such as theft. Operating a 
‘business-to-business-to-consumer’ (B2B2C) model, Praetorian contracts to offer its products 
to the customers of third-party organizations. Part of Praetorian’s success is its ability to 
negotiate contracts with many well-known UK high-street banks and financial institutions. In 
some instances Praetorian’s products are bundled with the bank’s premium products, but, 
more generally, Praetorian secures the right to market its products to the bank’s customers. 
Crucially, however, this marketing opportunity involves a number of deceptive practices that 
implicate both Praetorian and its commercial partners. 
 
Upon issue of new payment cards, bank customers are instructed to call to ‘activate’ the card 
as a security mechanism to ensure that the card is safely received by the intended recipient. 
Customers are in fact calling Praetorian and thus providing it with an opportunity to market 
its products. In many cases, cards do not require activation and would have worked 
irrespective of the call to Praetorian. In a very real sense, then, at the core of Praetorian’s 
business model there is deceit and lack of transparency in terms of its specific relationship 
with its customers and the purpose of its interaction with them. 
 
Fieldwork 
The research on which this article is based has its origins in background research I was 
conducting to gain a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of work and employment in 
the service economy generally and call centres specifically. Praetorian was selected as a site 
for research because of its campaign to recruit new employees, which focused upon its 
‘unique, fun, friendly atmosphere’. At an open day to showcase the company and encourage 
applicants, representatives from the organization outlined its products and demonstrated the 
way in which they are sold. The manifest tension between the way in which the culture of the 
organization was promoted and the required working methods provoked a number of 
potential research questions. 
 
I gained access to the organization setting as a new employee (sales adviser/agent) through an 
open recruitment process, and this allowed participation and observation of mis-selling in situ 
through employment. A covert approach to fieldwork was necessary because the practices 
that were common in the organization were not disclosed to customers and, as outlined 
above, involved embedded structural deceit. The research is ethnographic in the sense that it 
‘draws upon the writer’s close observation of and involvement with people in a particular 
social setting and relates the words spoken and the practices observed or experienced to the 
overall cultural framework within which they occurred’ (Watson, 2011: 205). Ethnography in 
its various forms has long been used as a way of exploring the everyday life of employees 
(Brannan et al., 2007) and is particularly appropriate for researching areas of employee 
behaviour which may be secretive or hidden because of their illicit nature (Bloor, 1997). In 
addition, and as a complement to the ethnographic approach, the research was informed by a 
reading of the ‘Sociology of Everyday Life’ (Kalekin-Fishman, 2013), which aims to draw 
specific attention to practices that are often taken for granted or assumed. In practical terms 
this is achieved by placing the everyday experience of work at Praetorian, as most obviously 
manifest in the sales call, at the centre of my analysis. If ethnography provided a 
methodological approach, the sociology of everyday life provided a specific focus whilst 
acknowledging and accepting that the ‘everyday always exceeds our ability to register it’ 
(Highmore, 2002: 3). 
 
Covert forms of social research are becoming increasingly rare as ‘ethics creep’ (Haggerty, 
2004) – that is, the bureaucratic apparatuses that regulate social research – extends its scope 
and intensifies its efforts. There are a strong set of intellectual arguments that problematize 
covert research on the grounds of deception (Bulmer, 1982), trust (Homan, 1991) and the 
infringement of participants’ rights (Ali and Kelly, 2012), especially in relation to 
participants’ ability to decide not to participate in the research. Yet objections to covert 
research are often based on what Spicker (2011) refers to as ‘over-generalisations’ that would 
apply to any research that embeds elements of deception. Although discussion of the role that 
deception plays in the research process is far from common, Fine (1993) reminds us that 
deception, whether intended or not, may actually be more common than is generally 
assumed. Specifically, he draws attention to a range of lies that may be told in pursuit of 
‘ethical’ ethnography. These range from offering mock sympathy to participants and 
removing particular individuals and circumstances from academic accounts, to claiming 
precision in cases where the presentation of ‘data’ is more akin to the ‘gist’ of a situation.  
 
Gaining part-time employment within the case study organization for the purpose of research 
required and permitted both disclosure and concealment. The fieldwork, which started in 
May 2008, lasted for 12 weeks and amounted to over 400 hours of field observations. I joined 
as part of a recruitment drive when Praetorian opened a new office to cement growth and 
generate new sales. I maintained the deception that I was ‘just’ an employee to the team 
leader, other managers in the call centre and those customers that I interacted with. The 
organizational context of the research meant that observations took place within a semi-
public (workplace) rather than a private setting. Whilst this does not offset the ethical 
problems of covert research, it does mean that the activities that were witnessed were not part 
of what Faden et al. refer to as a ‘zone of protected activity’ (1986), which is usually taken to 
mean private or intimate interactions. I conducted my employment duties to the best of my 
ability and in line with my employment contract, which, as a sales agent, involved the sale of 
identity-protection products priced at £29.99, £79.90 and £129.99 respectively. 
 
As part of what might be framed ‘situated ethics’ (Calvey, 2008), I gave careful consideration 
to ethical issues surrounding the research. Employment was secured using my own name, 
qualifications and relevant work history (such as previous call centre experience). During the 
period of employment I disclosed the nature of the research to those that I worked with most 
closely, including members of the team to which I was assigned and many of those who were 
recruited with me. This gave the opportunity to discuss objections; however, none were 
voiced, whilst many co-workers were supportive and remained in contact with me following 
my withdrawal from the field. The account presented here refers to contextual, potentially 
identifying material only when necessary for the purpose of the argument and is provided six 
years after completion of the fieldwork. This protects those I worked alongside, as they are 
no longer employed by Praetorian. The narrative and analysis advanced in this article has 
been reviewed and ‘fact checked’ by a former employee who continued to work at the site for 
a number of years following my departure. In what follows I attempt to provide ‘evocative 
stories that ring of truth’ (Rosen, 2000: xi) and convey, in Sumantra Ghoshal’s term, a ‘sense 
of the smell of the place’ (see Ghoshal, and Bartlett, 1994; Rynes, 2007, and De Vita, and 
Case, 2016). Quotes reported here were noted in situ, rather than recorded verbatim, and are 
indicative of the tenor of the discussion rather than explicit reproductions. I purposely 
employ as many voices as possible (as opposed to drawing, for example, from only my 
immediate teammates) in an effort to provide a sense of context from the call centre floor. 
 
Analytical process 
Observational notes were made in situ in a fieldwork notebook, and additional voice memos 
were recorded during the hour-long commute to and from the fieldwork site. I initially used 
my own personal experience, and specifically my emotional reactions to work, as a prompt 
for registering the characteristics of everyday life. I challenged myself to articulate those 
aspects of life that are so common as to lay hidden in plain sight. I noted the things that I 
found difficult and draining, the activities that were pleasurable and created a sense of 
enjoyment or fulfilment, as well as sources of frustration and anxiety. This provided a 
framework for observation and analysis of others (firstly immediate team members and then 
the wider workgroup) at work. 
 
In designing an observational and analytical strategy, I pursued explicit dimensions of 
descriptive, structural and contrastive observations. Descriptive observations prioritized 
participants’ descriptive accounts of their experience of Praetorian and their work histories in 
their own terms. Structural observations attempted to observe beyond surface appearance and 
to apprehend how participants made conceptual sense of their work – for example, the way in 
which different kinds of customers were categorized or the stages that new recruits went 
through to become trained agents. Moving beyond description to focus on ‘types’, ‘sorts’ and 
‘categories’ provided an empirically grounded starting point for analysis. Finally, contrastive 
observations sought to explore the construction and maintenance of difference in the eyes of 
employees; differences between the canteen and the break room, or between the early and the 
late shift, are examples of differences I found to be considered important in the workplace. 
Cutting across these dimensions, I focused on what has been termed the ‘anatomy of 
everyday life’ (Sztompka, 2008: 31) – that is, relations with others (customers, peers, 
trainers, managers) and repeated (rather than unique) events and happenings – whilst 
specifically noting the frequency and rhythms of those events. Finally, I looked to detect the 
development of ritualized, un-reflexive habitual behaviours and attendant biological cues for 
which my role as new recruit was especially apt. 
 
The insights on which the claims made in this article rest are therefore multidimensional. In 
the first instance I draw on the sensuous experience of being in the field; working at 
Praetorian allowed me to experience, for example, the initial optimism with which many 
employees first start work, and to witness its gradual erosion and replacement by fear, 
boredom and isolation. This embodied register provided a sensitivity to observe the 
behaviour of others and a shared vocabulary with which to engage other employees as I 
sought to explore ways in which work processes and sales techniques became embedded. Did 
everyone feel the same way? Were all employees enacting similar behaviours? Talking about 
my behaviour, my feelings and myself provided an open and transparent platform to ask 
others about themselves, their behaviour and their work. 
 
 
Notes from the ‘Bear Pit’ 
‘Buying in’ 
Becoming part of the team at Praetorian began with a two-week induction programme 
focusing on company products and sales techniques. I joined a group of 20 other new recruits 
at the company’s new call centre, which had been open for around a month. The preceding 
cohort of new staff, who had completed training, were just starting to take live calls. 
Induction and initial training were marshalled by Praetorian ‘old-timers’ (Blau, 1960) Jim 
and Cath, who both had extensive experience with Praetorian and claimed to have run the 
training workshop ‘hundreds of times before’. This was reinforced with a reference to a 
‘sense of déjà vu’ and consolations of ‘not to worry, we’ve seen this all before’ and ‘you’ll 
get it in the end’. Training took the form of a number of workshops focusing upon the sales 
processes, reasons for failure (of a sale) and technical skills relating to use of the integrated 
computer and phone unit. Initial training was supplemented by a phased introduction to 
taking live calls and, as a form of legitimate peripheral participation (Lave and Wenger, 
1991), provided opportunities for new recruits to put theoretical knowledge of sales into 
practice under close supervision from team managers and direct one-to-one call coaching. 
The structure of induction and training homologically mirrored the sales rituals that agents, 
through extensive repetition, came to internalize, draw upon and thus reproduce. Stressing the 
universality of the products and features that ‘would benefit everyone’, employees were 
invited to ‘see the value’ of products through the ‘imagineering’ of trainers who painted 
scenarios in which the products might be of use. The first sale Praetorian made therefore was 
to its employees, with the training processes casting new employees as potential customers 
for its products. 
 
The scope and extent of the sales training was both comprehensive and specific. Sales agents 
were taught the need to try to ‘understand the importance of language’; an understanding and 
appreciation of subtlety would, it was noted, ‘make you better salespeople’. Agents practised 
two basic sales techniques: the ‘feature route’ and the ‘scenario route’. Sales seminars 
outlined this clearly: 
 
‘Paint the scenario and shut up … What would happen if you came home from work 
and found that someone had taken out a £7,000 loan in your name?’ A hushed silence 
fell over the seminar. For emphasis Cath pointed to a trainee: ‘Well, what would 
YOU do? … Remember, people buy from people they like, people who they identify 
with, and have similarities with … make that connection.’ 
 
Making connections with customers was considered to be a key element of the sales ritual, 
and more specific techniques to achieve this included the matching of customer pitch and 
tone, listening for background cues in relation to lifestyle, and striking up a conversation 
about sporting events or happenings in the national headlines. 
 
Post training, agents were phased into taking live calls and placed in teams, or ‘pods’, of 
between 6 and 10 sale agents under team leaders drafted from other Praetorian sites. The pod, 
the basic unit of work organization on the sales floor, was located within an open-plan office, 
laid out in a U-shaped configuration, with shoulder-high dividers between teams. Shift 
managers were located at one end of the call centre floor, and senior operational, technical, 
HR and sales managers were located upstairs. 
 
New recruits were paid an annual salary of £13,520 (equivalent to £6.50 per hour, with 
minimum wage being £5.73 and UK median hourly earnings £10.54). In addition to this, 
employees were promised bonus payments on achieving and exceeding targets. Sliding-scale 
bonus payments were triggered when employees met 90 per cent of their sales targets as 
aggregated over a month. Sales targets were broken down on a daily basis and amounted to 
employees selling policies to the value of £500 a day. Achieving their target would attain 
employees a 10 per cent bonus on their monthly salary, with an increasing bonus for greater 
sales levels. 
 
Producing the sales ritual 
Most recruits were eager and excited to make the transition to taking live calls, both to put 
into practice their new skills and for the chance to start earning bonuses, which many 
perceived as being routinely achievable. Initially new starters focused almost all their 
attention on gaining technical mastery over the telephone and computer system, which 
proved demanding even for those with previous call centre experience. Having been told to 
put their hands up for help, new employees could often be identified as persistently having 
their hands in the air whilst they worked. Drawing ridicule from more experienced (if only in 
terms of a matter of days) or more confident employees, many resisted such public displays 
of inexperience. Other bodily responses, such as attempts to cover the headset microphone 
when talking to a colleague whilst on a live customer call, seemed an almost impossible urge 
to resist and would only be removed with many hours of experience on the call centre floor. 
 
Agents, initially at least, were given a script for each product that they sold alongside a ‘route 
map for successful sales’, with ‘Different colour text [which] marks mandatory and advisory 
text’. Agents were taught that mandatory text related to words that must be spoken in order 
for a call to be ‘compliant’. Employees understood that the firm was regulated by the FSA, 
which could ask at any time to visit the call centre or listen to a selection of calls, all of which 
were recorded. Praetorian also had its own compliance department, which selected calls 
randomly to determine compliance to sales guidelines. It was often quoted in training that 1 
in 10 successful calls would be reviewed for compliance purposes. This gave the issue of 
compliance a real meaning for employees and was reinforced by incidences of sales agents 
being taken ‘off-line’ for training as a result of something identified in a ‘compliance call’. In 
addition, agents would lose any monthly bonus if subsequent monitoring of calls found them 
to be non-compliant; this was known as ‘compliance clawback’ and was the issue most 
spoken about in relation to compliance. 
 
The sale script, which formed the basis of the ritual sales interaction, offered a number of 
suggested open questions aimed at engaging the customer in conversation. The structure of 
the call led customers to believe that the sales agents were filling the time whilst their 
payment cards were being activated, a deception reinforced by the sales scripts, which made 
conversational suggestions such as ‘I’m activating your card now. It will just take a few 
moments. Whilst you are on the line, can I talk to you about identity theft?’ Customer 
objections were met with a pacifying statement in relation to the need to raise awareness. 
 
Following engagement with customers, the sales agent then managed the call to a stage where 
key benefits of the product were outlined. Skilled agents learnt quickly which were the most 
attractive features of the product and would focus on these; less valued features could be left 
until the sale was close to being ‘closed’ and could be thrown in to sway the purchase. 
Agents were armed with a battery of statistics and figures to facilitate sales. Identity theft, for 
example, was carefully defined, in almost dictionary terms; this gave agents a sense of 
authority whilst on the call and invested the interaction with an almost benign tone. 
========= 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
========= 
Convincing customers to purchase – the sole objective of the sales ritual – was, however, a 
difficult and demanding task. Agents were taught a number of techniques for overcoming 
reluctant consumers as well as being provided with conversational cues or ‘cures’ if further 
objections were raised. These amounted to an acknowledgement of the objection and then its 
deconstruction. Agents were coached to try to prevent a range of possible objections within 
the early stages of the call through careful construction and management of the interaction. 
 
Unlike other call centres, tracking of team progress and success was expressed in terms of the 
generation of sales revenue rather than the volume of calls answered. On completion of a 
sale, agents were required to record their success with a marker pen on a mobile whiteboard, 
erasing the zero next to their name and replacing it with the value of the product sold. 
Successful sales also required the recalculation of the team’s daily revenue figure and 
‘percentage to goal’. Through the ritual of publicly recording sales, sales agents knew exactly 
what they had secured for that day and how far away they were from their goal. Beyond this, 
for some employees, the documenting of sales also provided a sense of social affirmation and 
motivation: 
 
‘Standing up, taking your headset off, walking tall, putting your sale on the 
whiteboard – it makes me feel like the big man.’ (Marc, sales agent) 
 
The whiteboard also materialized a clear link between individual and team, targets and 
performance, and hence became a space for competition as well as collaboration: 
 ‘I want to be competitive, I want to get on the board early. I like to be up and 
running.’ (Paul, sales agent) 
 
‘I like the sense that I’m rewarded for my hard work and I can see how that helps the 
team out. Even though we don’t have a team bonus, I still think it’s important to work 
as a team.’ (Sam, sales agent) 
 
The headsets that connected agents to the automatic call distribution system included a tether 
that allowed agents to get up and walk around the pod whilst remaining logged in to the 
system. It was not unusual to see agents updating the whiteboard in relation to a previous sale 
whilst talking to the next customer. Even when disconnected from the system, or not engaged 
on a call, agents tended to keep their headphones attached, often worn around the neck. 
 
The tone from the top 
An event early on in the fieldwork led to the sales floor being renamed the ‘bear pit’ and 
provides an insight into the tone that the company leadership tried to create within the call 
centre. Rumours had been circulating that a ‘bigwig’ was coming to meet the new recruits 
and inspect the new call centre. I noticed how the group of new recruits, after being called 
back from lunch early, seemed excited and chatted nervously, and there was a real buzz 
around the training room. Paul Pink from head office began: 
 
‘Shortly you’ll be going live – you’ll be in the bear pit! You’ll be expected to be up to 
speed straight away. Remember your training, but also remember that we chose you! 
We’ve got confidence that you’ll do well, but I don’t want you to do well – I want 
you to smash it!’ He threw his hands up in the air, and members of the group 
responded with orchestrated cheering initiated by team leaders. ‘The bear pit isn’t the 
place for the weak. I won’t be carrying you; you won’t be carrying each other. This is 
war. It’s about you versus them on the phones, and let me tell you, I’m backing you! 
Just remember we are a financial services company. Being target driven isn’t a 
choice, it’s a lifestyle. We’re all here to make sales, it’s in our DNA, it’s all there is. 
When I was on the floor working as a trader, I just wanted more, more, more. I want 
you to want more. I want you to want it so bad! So get in there, get me those numbers 
and enjoy your rewards! Don’t think for one minute this is going to be easy, but just 
remember, when you feel like you can’t sell shit, it’s been a God-awful day and 
you’re no way to your target, just remember when you’re pointing the finger at the 
customer for not buying, pointing the finger at your managers for not helping you, 
pointing the finger at your buddy for doing more revenue than you, just remember 
there are three fingers right there pointing back at you! Go get ’em!’ 
 
Despite the optimism that surrounded training and the phased introduction to live calls, the 
initial hours and days were difficult for new recruits, many finding sales hard to generate 
whilst being left in doubt as to what their targets were. 
 
‘I want £500 revenue per day. Every call is a possible sale. If you don’t sell, I want to 
know why.’ (Mark, team leader) 
 
The intense focus on making sales had profound effects on employees, as witnessed, for 
example, in the development of forms of superstition surrounding the sale process and the 
importance attached to attaining the first sale, or ‘getting one on the board’. 
 ‘I made my first sale today, I felt so much better. I was worried about losing the sale, 
but I remember in training they said that it’s almost impossible to lose a sale after the 
customer has agreed to buy.’ (Leah, sales agent) 
 
Whilst the pressure to attain targets was certainly evident, many agents spoke about more 
carnal and intrinsic motivations for achieving sales. 
 
‘It’s like a drug this job. You get one and then you can’t get enough.’ (Andrea, sales 
agent) 
 
‘It’s best when you get one first thing in the morning. I need that to start the day 
right.’ (Geoff, sales agent) 
 
‘The “comedown” when you don’t make a sale is awful. I hate it. I hate myself for 
failing.’ (Nicki, sales agent) 
 
As individual and team targets began to seem more difficult firstly to sustain and then even to 
attain, daily targets became broken down into hourly objectives. A well-established rule of 
thumb was that agents should be aiming to make one sale per hour, and that a 10 per cent 
conversion rate from calls to sales was considered the key to this. In training and embedded 
in practice, agents were encouraged to think about starting the day from zero to visualize how 
far they would have to go to achieve the day’s target. In such a performative context, simple 
greetings became an invitation to report on performance: 
 
Researcher ‘Alright, Jim, how are you?’ 
Jim  ‘I’m already 70 per cent to goal – that’s ace. I’ve still got four hours to go but 
I want to keep on, I want to smash it out the park!’ 
 
Yet, despite the visualization of future achievement, all agents faced the inescapable 
knowledge that future sales were, by their nature, unknowable and that there was an essential 
indeterminacy at the heart of the sales call. Agents quickly learnt, however, that irrespective 
of the specific customers that they spoke to and those customers’ need or desire for the 
product, they were expected to make sales. Management and team leaders were keen to 
ensure that agents had no excuses for non-sales.  
 
‘Don’t assume anything about the customer! It prevents you from selling and you can 
sell to everyone! Oldsters, youngsters, the unable and the infirm.’ (Dean, Team 
Leader) 
 
‘Every call is a chance to sell, even if it’s the wrong person – make sure you get to 
pitch! Sell, sell, sell, I want you to kill it.’ (Mark, Senior Operations Director) 
 
Managers, marked out by their conspicuous consumption of energy drinks, were active 
figures around the call centre floor. They patrolled the catwalks throughout the day, 
theatrically prompting, goading and consoling, but always celebrating sales success. 
‘Revenue like a cricket score,’ screamed Josh, ‘9 for 588’ – meaning nine sales generating 
£588 of revenue. Revenue figures began to dominate social interaction. ‘“How you doing?” 
(Sales agent mumbles response.) “I’m not asking how you are; I’m not interested. I only want 
to know what you’ve sold.”’ At hourly intervals managers began ‘the count’. This involved 
the calculation of all team revenue, against target, to produce an hourly summary that was 
subsequently reported to the senior managers. Calculations were done whilst standing 
reviewing the whiteboard, newer managers with small pocket calculators, more senior 
managers with oversize ones, all jabbing furiously with index fingers. 
 
Employees with previous sales experiences were quick to point out that the bonus regime at 
Praetorian was ‘harsh’. Jim (a former call salesman), for example, commented: ‘Other places 
award bonuses on the basis of a percentage of all sales.’ Moreover, those that had previous 
experience in financial services immediately recognized just how difficult it was to sustain 
the generation of revenue, at the required level, on a daily basis. As the difficulty of 
achieving targets became a reality to team members, their concerns began to grow. Stu, 
encouraged by initial sales success, bought a new car on finance shortly after he started work 
at Praetorian. Committed to long-term finance on the back of expected bonus earnings, he 
started to stay behind as the rest of the team left for breaks. Working through his lunch, 
stress, anxiety and fear became almost permanently etched on his face as the smile, wit and 
banter that I had so much enjoyed in training slowly disappeared. 
 
With every call constructed as an ‘opportunity to sell’, agents were often put in a position of 
explaining their lack of sales. Placing emphasis on the agency of employees as sellers rather 
than on customers as buyers underlined the unquestioned logic of a ‘sellers’ market’ that 
informed much of the behaviour I witnessed at Praetorian. Lack of sales was constructed as 
poor technique, motivation or both on behalf of employees, which further underscored the 
individual’s responsibility for achieving sales at all costs. 
 
Stu ‘What’s going on today? All the revenue is crap – no one is on it.’ 
Dan ‘I don’t know. You guys are on the phones – you tell me.’ 
Stu ‘It’s a really slow day today. No one is buying; it’s hard to get the message over.’ 
Dan ‘Oh, I must have missed that memo … telling the world not to buy! Use what excuse 
you want to use, but I want to see sales. Now get back on the phones, get out of your 
chairs and start selling shit!’ 
 
(Re)producing the sales ritual 
Despite the implied universality of the product, trainers and team leaders were keen to ensure 
that agents understood that effective sales techniques required subtlety, creativity and 
adjustments to approach, and hence deviation from the sales scripts. This was particularly the 
case as agents progressively became more familiar with the technical elements of the job and 
call handling became routine. Attention increasingly began to shift to the business of making 
sales, sometimes by any means, and this was accompanied by the development of a kind of 
‘folk knowledge’ in relation to customers – a collective mythmaking that worked to close the 
gap between sales agents and customers and resolve the indeterminacy of the sale interaction. 
The perceived social status of customers, for example, was considered an important starting 
point. Maria told me how certain customers, who were dismissed by some agents as ‘too poor 
to pay’, could sometimes ‘be manipulated into buying because of family concerns’. In this 
context, Dean suggested, ‘Why wouldn’t you want to protect your family?’ was an especially 
good question to ask of customers. By contrast, ‘professionals’ were viewed as able to see the 
technical benefits of the products, although often they would not buy on the principle ‘it 
won’t happen to me’. [Comments collected from team review and debrief by team leader, 
trainers and sales director.] In this context, the sales advice was ‘not to focus heavily on the 
features but rather to keep the tone light and build a connection through humour’. 
 
‘Lower occupations get off on talking to someone professional – so when you talk 
about the product, make sure you make it very technical; give ’em the bullshit. If you 
are talking to a professional you’ll not be able to bullshit them as much; they just 
want a laugh really.’ (Mark, Sales Agent, transferred from another site) 
 
The relentless nature of sales targets was inescapable and materialized at the end of each 
shift, as the agent with the highest revenue for the day was tasked with wiping the team’s 
figures from the whiteboard in preparation for starting again at zero the following morning. 
This perfectly illustrated the irrelevance of previous sales performance and subordination of 
all other factors to the achievement of daily revenue targets. Incessant focus on actual sales 
meant that stories of ‘near misses’ became an important currency and source of social 
bonding for many employees. It provided both a form of peer support and commiseration in 
terms of how difficult it was to achieve the sale: ‘[I] could almost taste it, I was this close,’ 
said Gill as she lamented another missed opportunity to sell.  
 
The intense pressure to achieve revenue meant that targets measured in monthly terms started 
to feel far beyond the reach of many team members. As agents tried to make enough revenue 
to keep managers off their back, thoughts of bonuses and compliance slipped out of their 
minds: 
 
Gill ‘Yeah, the compliance stuff – I remember when I first started, I read all the red 
text, word for word. That didn’t last long. I started cutting corners, missing 
bits out, paraphrasing, you know, because at the end of the day, customers 
don’t really want to hear that. They just want to get the product and get off the 
phone. It’s not like we don’t send them all the details in writing.’ 
 Sterling  ‘You’ve got to be really unlucky to get a compliance call. It’s not like they can 
listen to all your calls, so basically I put a bit of the stuff (compulsory 
compliance text) into the conversations and leave some stuff out. I think it’s a 
judgement call. Sometimes it’s good for the punters to hear, gives reassurance, 
credibility even, to the company, like we’re proper and you can trust us. Too 
much stuff though and it’s like, “Whoo, I’m not signing my life away.” It can 
be a real turn-off and you’ve lost the sale.’ 
 
Despite compliance clawbacks, as agents got progressively more experienced they inevitably 
started to drift away from compulsory scripting. This was facilitated by team leaders and 
managers, who recognized that effective sales required a departure from scripted interactions. 
In addition, some agents were openly sceptical about the extent and nature of Praetorian’s 
compliance intentions. 
 
Sam  ‘They (Praetorian) are not really interested in compliance. I mean, they say they are, 
but what else could they say? They know that if it’s left to us down here (sales agents 
and team managers), we’ll short-cut to get the sale. Listen to any call you like; there is 
no way it’s 100 per cent compliant. Yet how often do you see someone get called up 
for it? As long as you’re getting the revenue and making them look good, they don’t 
care, and if it all goes bad they can point to the script and say, “Well, we told them 
what to say.”’ 
 
Further, as intimated by Stu, non-compliance to compulsory scripted text seemed to many 
agents a gamble, a risk worth taking. 
 Stu ‘I have to get that bonus; it’s really important to me. I know I might lose some bonus 
via clawbacks, and that feels like a roulette wheel, but the odds are in my favour. If I 
don’t get the bonus, though, that’s different, I’ll struggle to live, and that’s Russian 
roulette – not a game I want to play.’ 
 
Analysis  
By focusing on the initial training and day-to-day work of new sales agents, this article has 
foregrounded the importance and ritualistic nature of the sales interaction at Praetorian. The 
specific constituent ritual elements were: the clearly codified discrete steps of the sales 
process; the sequencing and management of the interaction by the sales agent; the collective 
rote learning in training; the putting into practice through forms of growing participation; the 
separation of buyer and seller into mutually exclusive categories; and, paradoxically, the 
assumed universalism of the product, itself a prerequisite for group membership. Ritual 
performances took place in a group context despite the physical separation of employees, 
customers and employers from one another whilst engaged in calls. The recording and 
celebrating of ritual performance are embodied individual and collective rites (Van Gennep, 
1960) that play multiple social roles. Ritual is useful in making sense of the experience of 
employees at Praetorian and provides a foundation for understanding how mis-selling 
practices became embedded. It helps us to understand the nature of the training undertaken, 
the way employees were taught to think about and manage customer interactions, and the 
scope for creativity and diversions from scripting it provided. Ritual is thus an apt 
characterization of the required form that work performances took, whilst ritualistic is a 
useful description of the content of customer interactions. 
 
When understood as a ritual, the sales interaction, as the most basic premise of the 
organization, was revealed as a normalizing code that constituted a framework for employee 
understanding, meaning, purpose and inculcation of values (Stephenson, 2015: 41). The sales 
ritual materialized the belonging of employees through the demand for repetitive 
performance, but also placed individuals within a collective context. This was achieved 
through repeated references to the number of trainees who had been through the initial 
induction programme, for example. The practice of ritual allowed, and even required, 
deviation and creativity in enactment as a sign of individual maturity and competence. Thus 
sales rituals were never entirely prescribed nor employees enveloped. Therefore, whilst 
specific individual linguistic utterances were important (and the subject of regulatory focus), 
the nuance and dynamic nature of sales interactions means that both form and content are 
analytically significant. Thus sales calls, which took the form of elongated greetings at 
Praetorian, demanded, ‘as with all social relationships[,] reciprocity … an expectation in 
greeting is that it will elicit social recognition in return’ (Firth, 1972: 2). Attention to the form 
that sales interactions took thus highlights the structuring properties of ritual in patterning 
socially acceptable engagement for both employees and customers and the establishing of 
terms of engagement. The importance of ritual also alerts us to its ongoing role in 
socialization. Thus, following Michel (2014: 1107), we might conceive that the role played 
by everyday aspects of organizational practice (such as specific lines of scripted text and 
otherwise apparently innocuous greetings) in shaping employees and mapping the landscape 
of interaction is far more comprehensive than previously thought. 
 
Ritual tells us much about how employees at Praetorian come to think and behave in certain 
ways but raises questions of how and why these patterns of interaction constitute mis-selling 
and the specific relationship between these and other forms of mis-selling. In foregrounding 
the experience of front-line sales staff, we see how ritual produced mis-selling as constituted 
in the deliberate and negligent sale of financial services. The ritual provided interactive space 
for employees to draw on sophisticated sales repertoires in attempting to influence and 
persuade customers of their need for Praetorian products and services, whilst at the same 
time, convincing customers its intent was benign. Here the sales interaction is negligent in the 
sense that both the organization and employee fail in their duty of care to treat customers 
fairly by selling products that were, in a practical sense, unnecessary. Customer objections 
existed to be overcome and the actual usefulness of the product and the customer’s desire for 
it thus essentially rendered irrelevant.  
 
This genus of mis-selling exhibits both continuities and differences with other forms. The 
mis-selling of pensions for example, primarily involved negligence in terms of the discharge 
of poor advice from advisors in relation to moving from occupational and defined benefit 
schemes to private pension provision with variable returns. Individual advisors earned 
commission whilst the insurance industry charged high administrative and management fees.  
This is similar to the case of Praetorian with advisors incentivised to persuade customers 
without sufficient scrutiny or consideration of the actual likely benefit. Unlike pensions mis-
selling however the impetus for the purchase of Praetorian’s products was generally to have 
short to medium term protection against criminal activity. The risk of which, employees grew 
adept at exaggerating. The mis-selling of endowment policies or secondary insurance linked 
to primary interest-only mortgages, offered borrowers a way to generate sufficient capital on 
maturity to repay the capital component of the primary borrowing. The negligent sale of these 
policies related to the complexity of the endowment structure and the over-optimistic 
appraisal of endowment performance. With many customers being left with significant 
shortfalls, here again we see the influence of commission-based incentives for the individual 
advisor coupled with a systemic failure to ensure that customers were able to accurately grasp 
and assess product related risk.  In the case of Praetorian, customers’ feelings of being ‘at 
risk’ were distorted whilst consumers of endowment products often lacked an insight to the 
risks associated with products link to investment fund performance. It is however the mis-
selling of PPI, or secondary products to cover borrowing payments in the event of accident, 
sickness or job loss, that is most closely related to mis-selling of Praetorian.  Here policies 
were often excessively priced adding significantly to the original costs of borrowing whilst 
being sold to many whom were unable claim due to policy exclusions. Whilst sales agents at 
Praetorian often tried to convince customers of the value of the product, the complexity of the 
policy and redundancy inherent within it meant that in many cases customers were paying for 
protection that they already possessed rendering the policy literally worthless. Yet in stark 
contrast to all the major forms of mis-selling, Praetrorian is unique in its deployment of the 
masquerade central to its business model; ironically and inauthenticly pretending to be 
customer’s banks in order to sell identity protection.  
 
Praetorian sought to routinize compliance through scripting but, in line with research on the 
implementation of organizational regulation, effectively devolved this to managers and 
individual sales agents. The reasons for this, whilst beyond the scope of this article, are 
important but remain unclear. Whilst not without precedent, regulatory and compliance 
information is, for many firms, pre-recorded to ensure consistency, and this could have been 
an approach adopted by Praetorian if it had wished. The case study shows clearly that 
although compliance to sales guidelines was a feature of training and was actively enforced, 
management’s central concern remained the generation of revenue. Compare for example the 
codified nature of scripted compliance with the animated insistence on sales. Agents did, 
initially at least, adopt strategies to balance sales with compliance issues. Sales agents knew 
the importance of compliance, but often spoke about compliance in the past tense whilst 
foregrounding the immediacy of revenue generation. Given the target-based environment and 
the energy that team leaders put into encouraging sales, this is hardly surprising, and there is 
inevitability about the way in which compliance issues gradually faded from view. By putting 
the onus for compliance on individuals, Praetorian appeared to benefit by avoiding overly 
tight scripting of the sales interaction, which was seen as an asset in the generation of 
authentic customer interactions. This has significance for thinking about the design of 
regulatory environments and problematizes those frameworks that are built upon assumptions 
that management are willing and able to enforce ethical practice.  
 
For sales agents, to whom compliance was delegated, compliance was constructed in relation 
to specific ideas of how products should be sold, or, more specifically, the exact lines of 
dialogue, including terms and conditions, costs, coverage of policies and cancellation rights 
which had to be articulated during each transaction. Given the time-constrained nature of the 
customer interaction, it is perhaps not surprising that agents progressively populated this 
space with sales techniques rather than compliance information. In doing this, agents drew 
upon linguistic resources that were provided in training and learnt in a ritualistic fashion. The 
shifting of the regulatory burden to the lowest-possible organizational stratum effectively 
allowed individuals to determine their own level of compliance through self-regulation. 
Despite the presence of direct monitoring by team leaders, managers and an internal 
regulatory department, penalties for poor compliance, and external regulation by the FSA, I 
show how compliance was overlooked in pursuit of sales and how the sales ritual at 
Praetorian provided space for individuals to engage in mis-selling. 
 
Existing literature provides useful insights, at the individual level, into why agents may 
engage in unethical behaviour. Yet comprehending the widespread scale and embedded 
nature of mis-selling and other forms of financial misconduct, both at Praetorian and in the 
UK’s financial services more generally, demands analytical categories that transcend yet 
comprehend individual behaviour. Work that focuses on individual decisions to engage in 
unethical behaviour often over-emphasizes the scope of choice that patterns of requisite 
organizational engagement afford employees. Explanations and accounts of financial 
misconduct (together with the GFC more generally), both popular and scholarly, feature 
notions of culture heavily. Cultural explanation provides a way of understanding mis-selling 
that renders certain actions and behaviours acceptable in a given context and is therefore 
essentially permissive. However, cultural explanations risk reductive over-generalization and 
consequent essentializing of mis-selling whilst failing to note the nuance of agents’ 
experience and potential to do otherwise. Moreover, recourse to generalized cultural 
explanations in accounting for behaviour without detailed empirical study of behaviours in 
context risks becoming a clichéd form of analysis that strips the analytical category of culture 
of all explanatory power. A notable feature of the case study, for example, is the total lack of 
recourse to ‘culture’ made by Praetorian during initial training. New employees were not 
presented and asked to buy into a vision of Praetorian’s culture; rather, they were invited to 
buy in to the product as a condition of group membership and then asked to sell this product 
to customers. 
 
Whilst this analysis could be read as questioning the value of cultural explanations in 
accounting for mis-selling and financial misconduct more generally, the intention is not to 
claim that culture is unimportant. Rather, this analysis suggests that, at least in organizational 
contexts, we might be more cautious in the way in which we use culture as a tool for analysis. 
Membership of any organization constrains and limits the possible available choices for 
action and is therefore a cultural form, ‘a product of a particular sociohistorical context and 
embodying [of] particular value commitments’ (Smircich, 1983: 355). Analysis of cultural 
forms requires an understanding of what agents bring into being in terms of specific 
individual histories, knowledge and experience as well as bodily endowment, and what this 
means for the way in which organizational contexts and demands are interpreted, understood 
and reproduced. The former used-car salesman, for example, always understood the bonus 
structure at Praetorian to be problematic. Yet, frequently, analysis which foregrounds the role 
of culture treats those subject to it as if they are blank slates, without history or perspective. 
Consequently, rather than resorting to cultural explanation as a starting point, the analysis 
presented here encourages future empirical work to look towards those aspects of everyday 
organizational experience and practice that normally ‘we collapse into the label of 
organizational culture’ (Pettigrew, 1979: 572). That is to say, refocusing our analysis on 
those things that are more often dismissed as the product of culture might actually provide 
greater insight into the production of culture. This helps us to understand why new 
employees who have little or no previous experience of and thus exposure to organizational 
culture are so quickly able to engage in mis-selling. Mis-selling is thus not a cultural effect, 
but is produced through performance of ritual, and thus partially at least works to subsume 
psychology and structure, and performs rather than emerges from culture. 
 
Conclusion 
In seeking to explore the organizational dynamics of mis-selling, and how this emerges in a 
regulated context, this article draws attention to the role of the sales ritual in patterning the 
thinking and behaviour of sales agents. The case study also draws attention to the way in 
which ritual produces culture. This insight has wider significance with regard to the 
analytical value of the concept of culture in understanding the mis-selling phenomenon. 
Invoking sociological notions of culture that assume deeply sedimented forms of human 
activity and ‘tradition’ (Buono et al., 1985: 482) can only be of limited relevance in fast-
paced environments such as the call centre sales floor and may only be partially relevant to 
organizational contexts more generally. To what extent, for example, can a newly opened call 
centre be said to have a culture in any distinct sense? Can that culture be so robust as to 
substantively influence the behaviour of employees after only two weeks of exposure? Yet 
without recourse to notions of culture, how might we explain the systematic collective 
behaviour of individual autonomous sales agents? The contribution of this article is to shift 
attention away from individual explanations of misbehaviour whilst also raising questions 
about the analytical use of culture, in its permissive form, and its explanatory potential in 
contemporary organizational contexts, which often seem to be marked by change, disruption 
and reconfiguration. By focusing upon the essential rituals of organizations, frequently 
mistaken as products of culture and hidden in plain sight, the response offered here moves 
attention to an understanding of the mechanisms that actually produce culture. 
 
Participative fieldwork, and the attention this gives to the routines and rituals of everyday life 
in the call centre, is important in terms of understanding the role of mis-selling and how this 
is embedded within organizational practices. This contribution therefore serves as a partial 
corrective to the insistent focus upon professional elites, especially within the financial 
services industry, in relation to both GFC and misconduct more generally. An exclusive focus 
on hierarchy tends to reify the role of leadership and universalize particular sets of values that 
are associated with it. Moreover, as Mathiesen (1997) suggests, in the case of wrongdoing, 
existing social arrangements are effectively legitimized with such a focus, albeit at the cost of 
successive token sacrifices. In doing so, the illusion of control is maintained, which provides 
a means for the many to see the few (Levi, 2006: 1050), with ‘business as usual’ allowed to 
continue. In part, the contribution made here may help to overcome the demonization of 
employees in the financial services industry, yet it also helps us to understand that unethical 
behaviour is endemic and systematic, and is far from abnormal or restricted to a select few 
firms or key individuals. Understanding ritual everyday organizational practices highlights 
the grounds on which participation is expected from employees and demonstrates the limits 
and constraints that govern the ways in which relationships with customers can exist. This 
transcends individualistic psychological approaches to mis-selling and offers a way of 
thinking about how individual action is brought into being in collective contexts, thus 
providing a starting point for thinking about organizational interventions. 
 
In a wider context, the analysis presented here has specific implications for the growing trend 
towards culture as a descriptive panacea (as opposed to an analytical device), which identifies 
culture as the universal explanation for misbehaviour within organizations. In the UK, for 
example, culture has become a key feature of the public understanding of wrongdoing in a 
number of organizational and institutional contexts.3 In many of these cases, culture as a 
specific form within a single organization, or as a more general form and set of practices and 
expectations within an industry, is accorded a significant role in allowing or facilitating the 
most serious and egregious conduct. The case made here suggests that recourse to this idea of 
culture – without a detailed empirical investigation of the mundane routines that constitute 
organizational life and the practices that are afforded and limited within it – is an explanation 
that is empty of meaning. The challenge this poses for organizational scholars, therefore, is to 
seek a more finely grained analysis of our notions of culture as they pertain to organizational 
contexts and to re-tool our collective research methods so that we might explore culture, and 
the everyday practices that produce it, more fully, more critically, more ethnographically. 
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Notes 
1 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) provided regulation for the financial 
services industry (initially banking supervision and investment services, but growing to 
include mortgage and general insurance) from 1997 to 2013. The FSA was succeeded by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which now has responsibility for integrity and stability 
of markets and ensuring a fair deal for customers. The Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA), a part of the Bank of England, has responsibility for maintaining safety and 
soundness of individual firms, whilst both regulators have a mandate to promote competition 
within the various retail financial markets. 
 
2 Tom Hayes is a former UBS and Citigroup trader who, in August 2015, was sentence to 14 
years in prison financial misconduct. Although this was reduced to 11 years on appeal,  it 
remains the most severe sentence imposed  on an individual for financial crime un the UK. It 
was alleged by the prosecution that Hayes led a conspiracy to artificially manipulate the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) benchmark, in order to benefit his own trades. 
Throughout the trial and subsequent appeal, Hayes claimed such manipulation of the rate was 
standard practice within the industry and conducted in full knowledge of senior bank 
management. 
 
3 See for example the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards report Changing 
Banking for Good (2013), which locates culture as central to understanding successive 
financial scandals, but also key to the sector’s reform: ‘Banking culture has all too often been 
characterised by an absence of any sense of duty to the customer and a similar absence of any 
sense of collective responsibility to uphold the reputation of the industry’ (Para 135). See also 
the Independent Panel on Hillsborough (2012), which notes that the ‘culture of the police was 
influential’ in the way in which football matches were policed and that police defendants 
were guilty of negligence in relation to the duty of care that they had to the deceased 
(Hillsborough, 2012: 56). See also the Leveson Inquiry (2012), established specifically to 
review the culture, practice and ethics in the British press, which found a culture of 
‘recklessness in prioritising sensational stories, almost irrespective of the harm that the stories 
may cause and the rights of those who would be affected (perhaps in a way that can never be 
remedied), all the while heedless of the public interest’. See also the case of the report into 
poor care and high mortality at Stafford Hospital. The official report found that Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust ‘failed to tackle an insidious negative culture involving 
a tolerance of poor standards and a disengagement from managerial and leadership 
responsibilities’ (Francis, 2013). See also Alexis Jay’s report into child exploitation in 
Rotherham, which stated: ‘The prevailing culture at the most senior level of the Council, until 
2009, as described by several people, was bullying and “macho”, and not an appropriate 
climate in which to discuss the rape and sexual exploitation of young people.’ See also the 
report on lessons learnt from NHS investigations into matters relating to Jimmy Savile 
(2015), in which Kate Lampard and Ed Marsden found the NHS at the time to ‘lack a culture 
where whistle-blowing can take place’. 
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